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Glasser's second ground of appeal-that he had not been tried by an impartial jury
-would require a reversal, if the allegations could be sustained by proof that the
jurors were biassed.3o Membership in the league would not of itself be a ground for disqualification unless the league were actively interested in the litigation.3' It was not
improper for the league to submit a list of prospective jurors,32 although it is improper
to delegate the final choice to it, no matter how high-minded its motives.3 However,
the disqualification of jurors on ground of bias is peculiarly a matter for the trial
court,3 4 and reviewing courts are sparing in the use of their powers to set aside its de-

cision.3s Glasser based his affidavit on an article written by one of the women of the
panel from which the jury was selected.36 The trial court considered his petition and
was convinced that the defendants were not prejudiced by the composition of the
jury; and the circuit court of appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion.37 Clearly, the jury should be a body truly representative of the community;38
but this doctrine grew out of, and primarily relates to, the exclusion of persons from the
jury lists on account of racial discrimination.39 It may be questioned whether its application in the instant case is entirely consistent with its history and traditional
usage.
Copyrights-Assignability of Right of Renewal-[Federal].-In 1912, Graff, a lyricist, assigned to the'plaintiff music publishers the copyright to his lyric, "When Irish
Eyes Are Smiling," pursuant to a general royalty agreement under which Graff was
30 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 678 (8th ed. 1927); Wood v. United States, 83 F.
(2d) 587, 589 (App. D.C. 1936).
3' Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 501 (1923), cert. den. 263 U.S. 717 (1924) (membership in Anti-Saloon League in case involving violation of National Prohibition Act); Noonan
v. Saline County Coal Co., i73 Ill. App. 541 (1912) (membership in United Mine Workers
in case between member of union and his employer); Musick v. People, 40 Ill. 268 (i866)
(membership in society for detection and prosecution of horse thieves in prosecution for
stealing a horse). See 31 A.L.R. 411 (1924).

Walker v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 383 (C.C.A. 8th 1937).
United States v. Murphy, 224 Fed. 554 (D.C.N.Y. 1915). Thus, the clerk may not exclude names otherwise qualified, merely because they do not appear in the list submitted by
the league. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 35 F. Supp. xo5 (Cal. I94O).
34 Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (igog); Union Electric Light & Power Co.
v. Snyder Estate, 65 F. (2d) 297 (C.C.A. 8th 1933).
3s Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878); Frank v. United States, 59 F. (2d)
670, 675 (C.C.A. 9 th 1932).
36 Women and the Law, 26 A.B.A.J. 354 (zg4o). The writer states: "With one exception,
the women were all members of the League of Women Voters, who had been recommended by
that organization at the invitation of the court." In the same article it is said: "All the information we had, had been given us by members of the Bar Association and distinguished
judges."
37 United States v. Glasser, 16 F. (2d) 69o, 705 (C.C.A. 7th 194o).
38 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
32

33

39 Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 309 (1879); Martin v. Texas,
(i9o6); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (194o).
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woiking. The Copyright Act of I9og gives an author the right to renew his copyright
for another twenty-eight year period, providing he is living one year before the expiration of the original period. If the author dies, the renewal right accrues to his widow or
children.2 In z917, Graff, fin;ncially desperate, released his royalties and assigned his
expectancy of the renewal rights in the song. in question and in sixty-nine other songs
written under the general agreement to the plaintiff for a consideration of $i6oo. In
connection with the assignment Graff also executed an "irrevocable power of attorney"
to exercise the renewal right. Graff testified that at the time of the assignment the
songs were earning royalties of $5ooo yearly. In 1939 Graff applied for a renewal, which
he assigned to the defendant. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for copyright
infringement and for an interlocutory decree restraining the defendant from publishing
the song pendente lite. The decree was granted,3 and the defendant appealed on the
ground that the assignment of the renewal rights violated the policy of the Copyright
Act. Held, Frank, J., dissenting, in the absence of express statutory restraint, the
common law policy in favor of alienability prevails, and the assignment is valid. Witmark & Sons v. FredFisher Music Co.4
The principal case is the first to present the issue whether a right to renew a copyright under the Copyright Act of igog is assignable.s The statute does not, in express
terms, seem to forbid an assignment, stating merely, "the author ....ifstill living, or
shall
the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, .
be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright ....for a further term of
twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been
6
made ....within one year prior to the original term of copyright." The problem before the court, therefore, was one of statutory interpretation. None of the usual extrinsic aids to interpretation sufficed to induce a unanimous decision by the court, however. The legislative history of the act, studied in isolation, is ambignous;7 the opinion
of legal text-writers is divided;8 the fact that subsequent proposed amendments to the
act mentioned the possibility of an author's assigning the renewal was used by both
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Stat. io8o (igog), amended by 54 Stat. 5i (1940), 17 U.S.C.A. § 23 (Supp. 1941).

(1927).

3Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (N.Y. 1941), noted in 55 Harv.
L. Rev. 139 (1942).
4 125 F. (2d) 949 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
s This case has been followed, albeit reluctantly. Selwyn & Co. v. Veiller, 43 F. Supp. 491
(N.Y. 1942). See Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F. (2d) 57, 6o (C.C.A. 2d 1938), cert. den.
305 U.S. 650 (1938). But see Silverman v. Sunrise Picture Corp., 273 Fed. 9o9 (C.C.A. 2d 1921),
modified on other grounds, 29o Fed. 8o4 (C.C.A. 2d 1923), cert. den. 262 U.S. 758 (1923).
635 Stat. io8o (i909), amended by 54 Stat. 51 (1940), 17 U.S.C.A. § 23 (Supp. I94I).
7See H.R. Rep. No. 222o, 6oth Cong., 2d Sess. (i909). The House Report was adopted by
the Senate Committee on Patents as its own. S. Rep. No. iio8, 6oth Cong., 2d Sess. (i909).
8
The following definitely state that the renewal right is assignable: Drone, Law of Property
326, 332 (x879); MacGillivray, The Law of Copyright 267 (1902); Curtis, The Law of Copy-

right 253 (1847); Copyright Renewal, lo Air Law Rev. 198, %99 (i939). The following tend
to hedge on the issue: Weil, Copyright Law 367 (1917); 2 Ladas, International Protection of
Literary and Artistic Property 773 (1938); Frohlichand Schwartz, The Law of Motion Pictures
549 ([918).

Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice 532-38, 54o-4i (1936), seems to contend

that the right is not assignable.
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sides.9 In view of the ambiguity of the statute, both majority and minority felt compelled to construe it in the light of general policy considerations.
The majority, in the instant case, were impressed with the history of the legal struggle against restraints upon the alienation of real property and the line of decisions which
finally upheld the assignability of choses in action. From this history they concluded
that public policy was so markedly in favor of a man's being able to translate his property rights into money that nothing so drastic as a restraint upon this power should
be read into a statute in the absence of express terms to that effect.10 Assuming the
majority's position to be sound, it is still difficult to fit the author's right of renewal
into the framework of common law property and contract rights. It has long been held
that all rights accruing to authors under the copyright acts are merely statutory and
should be distinguished from "common law" rights of property in literary works."
Statutes which have created such rights have qualified them so variously that it is difficult to analogize them to any of the recognized common law rights. For example, upon
the death of the author before the original term has run, the right to the renewal does
not accrue to the benefit of his estate, but only to those specifically referred to in the
statute. Nor do purported assignments on the part of the author serve to cut off the
statutory beneficiaries.'2 Furthermore, although it might be said that the right of renewal resembles a contingent remainder, this view has not been accepted by the
courts Z3 However, even if the analogy to contingent remainders were pursued, the

common law has always regarded the alienation of contingent interests with extreme
disfavor,X4 obviously because of the element of uncertainty and speculation involved in
their evaluation.
9H.R. 6990, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 10434, 69 th Cong., ist Sess.; H.R. 11948, 72d
Cong., ist Sess.; H.R. 926, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. The majority thought that these bills indicated that Congress thought that such an assignment was possible. Witmark & Sons v. Fred
Fisher Music Co., 125 F. (2d) 949, 953 (C.C.A. 2d 1942). Frank, J., was of opinion that these
bills indicated that the draftsmen believed that such legislation was needed to validate such
an assignment. Ibid., at 959.
zo Frank, J., admitted that at one thm there had been such a strong policy in favor of the
general freedom of contract, but he insisted that such a policy was never exclusively dominant,
and that it represented the culmination of the doctrines of classical laissez-faire, which both
courts and legislatures had long since rejected. He berated the majority for being in the grip
of "that 'old Adam'-Adam Smith." Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F. (2d)
949, 962-68 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
" Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (U.S.) 591 (1834); Drone, op. cit. supra note 8, at ioo. Thus
Paige v. Banks, x3 Wall. (U.S.) 6o8 (187), cited by the majority in the principal case, can be
distinguished because in that case it appears that the author assigned the "common law"
property in the work before publication to the publisher, who took out the copyright in his
own name and was then held entitled to the renewal.
12 Silverman v. Sunrise Picture Corp., 273 Fed. 909, 912 (C.C.A. 2d 1921), modified on
other grounds, 29o Fed. 8o4 (C.C.A. 2d 1923), cert. den. 262 U.S. 758 (1923). The fact that in
certain instances an executor will have a right which the author never had has not bothered the
courts. Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326, 329 (1923).
X3A renewal is an independent statutory grant rather than any kind of extension of the
original copyright. Southern Music Co. v. Bibo-Lang, Inc., io F. Supp. 975 (N.Y. 1935);
see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 27 F. Supp. 1i, 13 (N.Y. 1939).
14 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 341 (3d ed. 1939). These interests have been made assign-

able in some cases by statute-but not by judicial decision. Ibid.
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Thus it would appear that there is no reason to construe the copyright act strictly, as
being in derogation of rights existing at common law, or as being subject to general
rules of common law policy.'s In fact, it would seem that the constitutional and legislative background of the copyright acts demonstrates that the policy behind them was inconsistent with common law traditions. A copyright was originally a royal grant; it appears to have been used by the king to curry favor with the stationers' guilds and to control the press.' 6 Alleged abuses of the Crown's power to grant copyrights and other
monopolies gave the common law courts occasion to seize upon the rising opposition to
these abuses and to forge it into an enduring public policy. 17 In 1624 by act of Parliament the king was shorn of his powers to grant monopolies.' s This policy may have
been prompted primarily by Parliament's desire to wrest power from the king and to
vest it in itself. Under the influence of the writings of the classical economists, however, the policy became one of the main tenets of the theoryof laissez-faire, and has been
so applied by the courts.' 9
Nevertheless, copyright legislation has been enacted in direct contravention to the
anti-monopoly policy. It was felt that an overriding policy existed in favor of protecting and encouraging authors, even if the only way this could be accomplished was
through the granting of a qualified monopoly. In England the Copyright Act of i7o920
was passed, giving a limited period of monopoly to the holder of a copyright under the
statute, with the proviso that when the period was over the work was to become the
property of the general public. In the colonies, the statutes resembled those of the
mother country,"1 although in some colonial statutes the monopoly feature was qualified even further by the provision that the copyright should last only so long as the
copyright holder provided an adequate supply of the copyrighted material at reasonable prices.2 The policy in favor of authors found its way into the Constitution in the
patents and copyrights clause: "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.123 This is the only clause in the entire Con" SIn Powell v. Head, I Ch.D. 686, 688 (1879), it was argued that the part owner of a play
could grant a license for its production without the consent of the other owners because, at
common law, one tenant in common of a chattel has a right to use the chattel as he pleases.
Jessel, M.R., rejected this argument, saying: "I am not at all inclined to extend the antiquated and barbarous doctrines, which have been set aside partly by the Legislature and partly
by the Courts of Equity, to new rights created by statute, and which are of a character wholly
different from the rights of property to which these ancient doctrines apply." Cf. Holmes, J.,
dissenting, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921).
166 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 360-79 (2d ed. 1937).

Ibid.; Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise, TNEC Monograph No. 31, at 14 (1941).
isHamilton, op. cit. supra note 17, at iS-i8.
'7

'9 Thus an agreement not to compete, coupled with the sale of a business, will not be enforced where it would tend to create a monopoly. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1641, at 46oo (rev.
ed. 1937).
20 8 Anne, c. 19 (T709).
" Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 17, at I8-22.
22Ibid., at 22.
23U.S. Const. art. i, § 8 (8). That this limitation on the power should be constantly kept
in mind in construing copyright and patent statutes has been brought out by the renewed vi-
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stitution which is directed toward the benefit of a special class of individuals. It would
seem that a policy looking toward the protection of authors which was compelling
enough not only to receive constitutional recognition, but also to override a deep-seated
common law policy against monopolies of any kind, is also of sufficient force to override a relatively weaker common law policy in favor of assignability, especially where
the right in question has no relation to the common law.
Viewed in this light, certain aspects of the legislative history of the copyright acts
take on more significance.24 For instance, the following passage is found in the committee report on the Copyright Act of 19o9: "It was urged before the committee that it
would be better to have a single term without any right of renewal, and a term of life
and fifty years was suggested. Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it
was distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not
infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a
comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the
term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of
the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the existing law,
so that he could not be deprived of that right.'' 2s In the opinion of the Attorney General,
the renewal right under this statute could be applied for only in the name of the author.6 Hence it would seem that Congress, in drafting copyright legislation, was not
attempting to enable a publisher, by having the author sign another form,27 to acquire
a long-term monopoly in contravention of common law policy, and in contravention
also of a constitutional policy which looked only toward the protection of authors.
The policy of the copyright acts interpreted in the light of the constitutional background would seem to dovetail nicely with modern ideas of social policy. Older ideas of
freedom of contract have been seriously restricted by statute in the interest of certain
segments of the public. "Yellow-dog contracts" have been outlawed;28 assignments of
wages have been forbidden or stringently regulated;A2 members of the general public
have been forced to contribute to provisions for their old age under the Social Security
Act.30 Freedom of contract has likewise met with judicial qualification, especially
tality given the clause in several recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (x94); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,
314 U.S. 488 (i942), noted in 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 518 (942); United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 62 S.Ct. 1o88 (1942).
24 Dissenting opinion of Frank, J., in Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.
(2d) 949, 957-58 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
2s H.R. Rep. No. 2220, op. cit. supra note 7 (italics added).
26 28 Ops. Atty. Gen. 162 (i91o).
27 The majority of the court in the principal case felt that the power of attorney was entitled to respect because it was the historical bridge whereby assignments not recognized at
law were actually enforced. *Frank, J., compared the effect of the majority's decision on the
Copyright Act of i9og with the manner in which the English courts treated the Statute of
Uses--"adding three words to a conveyance." Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co.,
125 F. (2d) 949,959 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
2 1i
Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 48 (1940).
29 Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago, 42 Yale L. J. 526 (1933).
30 49 Stat. 620 (i935), amended by 53 Stat. 136o (i939), 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 (Supp. 194).
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where the parties have been in disparate positions. Perhaps the oldest manifestation of
this tendency was the manner in which the chancellor looked behind an apparent conveyance of real property to declare a mortage and give an equity of redemption.3r
Among the most recent manifestations are rulings to the effect that a person included
within the provisions of a workmen's compensation act cannot validly~contract himself out of the statute, 32 and that a person working under a wages and hours statute
cannot effectively release his statutory claims against his employer.33 Equity especially has exhibited this tendency, particularly in respect to the assignment of mere expectancies. While in some jurisdictions such assignments have been enforced,34 equity
always looks to the transaction itself with extreme suspicion for several reasons: i) the
assignor of an expectancy was generally in desperate circumstances at the time of the
assignment;3S 2) he was generally greatly inferior in business experience; 6 3) the difficulty in assessing the value of the expectancy usually results in a totally inadequate
consideration.37
Since analogous considerations are applicable in the instant case, it would seem that
the least equity could.do is to refuse to enforce the assignment, leaving the parties to
damages at law. This would probably lead to a settlement. However, in view of the
gambling nature of the contract, the unequal position of the author, the general inadequacy of consideration and the constitutional policy involved, the only straightforward answer to the situation would be to declare assignments like that in the principal
case invalid.

Federal Courts-Removal Jurisdiction of Suits "Arising under" Federal StatuteFair Labor Standards Act-[Federal].-Plaintiff brought suit in a state court to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages, and damages, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,' which provides that such a suit "may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction.' 2 Defendant removed to the federal district court on the
ground that the suit arose under a law regulating commerce, to which the requirement
3' 5Tiffany, Real Property § 1379 (3 d ed. i939). Cf. Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure,
4 Univ. Ch. L. Rev. 575 (1937).

3 Wass v. Bracker Construction Co., 185 Minn. 70, 24o N.W. 464 (1931).
3 Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F. (2d) 622, 626 (C.C.A. 7th x941); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Morley Construction Co., 98 F. (2d) 781, 789 (C.C.A. 2d 1938); Travis v.
Ray, 41 F. Supp. 6, 8 (Ky. x94'); Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 5 Wage and Hour
Rep. 389 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
34 Inre Lind, [1915] 2 Ch.Div. 345. Contra: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231 N.W.
675 (1930). See McClure v. Raben, 125 Ind. 139, 25 N.E. 179 (i8go); Donough v. Garland,
269 Ill. 565, io9 N.E. ioi 5 (i915).
35 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §953 (Symons ed. 1941).
36 Ames v. Ames, 46 Ind. App. 597, 91 N.E. 5o9 (1910); 2 Chafee and Simpson, Cases on

Equity 1,73-93, 185 n. 5 (1934).
37
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